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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:53 pm
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Results for commercial crimes
15 results foundAuthor: KPMG Title: Independent Research into Crimes Against Businesses in Northern Ireland Summary: The aims of this research was to better understand the problem of business related crime in Northern Ireland and how businesses, business organisations and other relevant stakeholders believe it could be tackled and reduced. The research included a literature review; a postal survey of almost 5,000 non-agricultural businesses in Northern Ireland; focus groups among non-agricultural businesses and organisations representing business; semi-structured telephone interviews with representatives from agricultural businesses; and individual interviews with a range of businesses, organisations representing business and other stakeholders. Details: Dublin: KPMG, 2008. 95p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 119508 Keywords: Business CrimeCommercial CrimesCrime PreventionRetail Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Corporate Crime: DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, but Should Evaluate Effectiveness Summary: Recent cases of corporate fraud and mismanagement heighten the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime. Recently, DOJ has made more use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prosecutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring prosecution. In June and November 2009, GAO testified on DOJ’s use and oversight of DPAs and NPAs, and this report discusses additional findings, including (1) the extent to which DOJ has used DPAs and NPAs to address corporate misconduct and tracks use of these agreements, (2) the extent to which DOJ measures the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs, and (3) the role of the court in the DPA and NPA process. GAO examined 152 DPAs and NPAs negotiated from 1993 through September 2009 and analyzed DOJ data on corporate prosecutions in fiscal years 2004 through 2009. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials, prosecutors from 13 DOJ offices, 20 company representatives, 11 monitors who oversee company compliance, and 12 federal judges. While not generalizable, these results provide insight into decisions about DPAs and NPAs. GAO recommends that DOJ develop performance measures to assess the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs. DOJ agreed with our recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10110.pdf Shelf Number: 119649 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCorporate CrimeFraudProsecution |
Author: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Title: Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Summary: The ACFE's 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse is based on data compiled from a study of 1,843 cases of occupational fraud that occurred worldwide between January 2008 and December 2009. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated those cases. The fraud cases in our study came from 106 nations — with more than 40% of cases occurring in countries outside the United States — providing a truly global view into the plague of occupational fraud. In our 2010 Report, we have, for the first time ever, widened our study to include cases from countries outside the United States. This expansion allows us to more fully explore the truly global nature of occupational fraud and provides an enhanced view into the severity and impact of these crimes. Additionally, we are able to compare the anti-fraud measures taken by organizations worldwide in order to give fraud fighters everywhere the most applicable and useful information to help them in their fraud prevention and detection efforts. Details: Austin, TX: ACFE, 2010. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf Shelf Number: 119736 Keywords: Commercial CrimesFraud InvestigationOccupational Fraud |
Author: Welsh Enterprise Institute (University of Glamorgan, Business School) Title: Putting the Economy Back on Track: Crimes Against Business Summary: The stark reality is that 64% of businesses fell victim to crime over a twelve-month period, and crime costs each business an average of £13,354 a year. The uncertainty in the financial markets is a concern for many small businesses, and an effective response to tackle crimes that are eating away at our local communities and national economy is now more important than ever. The survey results show that crimes targeted against small business are on the rise. Crime affects a business’ ability to meet customer deadlines and attract customers and adversely affects its profitability, ultimately resulting in businesses closing down and jobs and local economies being put at risk. Valuable time and resources are spent dealing with the aftermath of a crime and businesses are feeling the squeeze of narrowing profit margins and rising insurance premiums. Businesses, and their staff in the local community, are victims of repeat crime in the form of vandalism, vehicle damage and threatening behaviour. Crimes against business make up a significant 20%, or the ‘Forgotten Fifth’, of all recorded crime in the UK. An effective response at a national, regional and local level is necessary for the sustainability of our local communities and the national economy. Neighbourhood Policing Units (NPUs) are hailed as the answer to local crime problems. Businesses themselves have some faith in NPUs as an effective response to crime at a local level. However, far fewer businesses have had any direct contact with their local unit. This needs to change, especially when it is claimed that businesses are a ‘strategic partner’. NPUs should be engaging directly with the business community and making it a priority to factor their views and interests into local strategies to tackle crime against business. Details: London: Federation of Small Businesses, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2010 at: http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/Publications Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/Publications Shelf Number: 119833 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCrime StatisticsCrimes Against BusinessesNeighborhood PolicingRetail CrimeVandalism |
Author: Carter, Sara Title: Crime and the Small Business Summary: In April 2004, the Federation of Small Businesses published “Lifting the Barriers to Growth in UK Small Businesses”, a summary of the results of the third biennial survey of the FSB membership. This new report provides a more detailed analysis of the data collected in the 2004 survey on the effect of crime in the small business sector. Here, we investigate the extent to which small businesses are affected by crime, the cost of crime to the small business sector and the crime prevention measures that they adopt to combat crime. Details: London: Federation of Small Businesses, 2005. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2010 at: http://www.fsb.org.uk/documentstore/filedetails.asp?id=229 Year: 2005 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.fsb.org.uk/documentstore/filedetails.asp?id=229 Shelf Number: 119834 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCrime StatisticsCrimes Against BusinessesRetail Crime |
Author: Amin, Mohammad Title: Crime, Security, and Firms in Latin America Summary: Existing studies show that crime is more rampant in the larger cities and that wealthier individuals are more often targeted. Using Enterprise Surveys data for 14 Latin American countries, we find that one- third of the firms surveyed suffer from one or more incident of crime annually, which is roughly similar to the percentage of households affected. Crime-related losses average 2.7 percent of annual sales for all firms in the sample, which is more than the reported amount of bribery, losses due to power outages, and firms’ expenditure on research and development. We also find that the relatively well-off large firms are more likely to be victims of crime than the small firms, but losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales are bigger for small firms. In short, crime in the region is regressive. Last, larger cities are more prone to crime than the smaller cities. However, we find that what matters for crime is the relative size of a city within a country; its absolute size is irrelevant. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Enterprise Note Series No. 2: Accessed April 6, 2011 at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note2.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note2.pdf Shelf Number: 121253 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCrime StatisticsUrban Crime (Latin America)Victimization (Businesses) |
Author: Amin, Mohammad Title: Crime and Security in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Region Summary: About 20 percent of firms in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region are victims of crime during a year. While losses to firms from crime incidents average 0.5 percent of a firm’s annual sales, expenses by firms for security average 1.4 percent of their annual sales. These two costs, equaling 1.9 percent of a firm’s annual sales, are about eight times what firms spend on research and development (R&D) and 1.8 times the reported amount paid in bribes. Surprisingly, higher-income countries do not have more crime related problems compared to lower-income countries. Although large firms are more likely to be victims of crime than small firms, losses from crime as a percentage of firms’ annual sales are much larger for the smaller firms. With the exception of the firm’s business activity and whether or not a firm innovates, other firm characteristics have little relation to the incidence of crime and losses due to crime faced by a firm. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Enterprise Note Series, no. 15: Accessed April 6, 2011 at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note15.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Documents/EnterpriseNotes/Note15.pdf Shelf Number: 121255 Keywords: Commercial CrimesVictimization (Businesses) |
Author: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Title: 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Summary: "The ACFE's 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse is based on data compiled from a study of 1,843 cases of occupational fraud that occurred worldwide between January 2008 and December 2009. All information was provided by the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) who investigated those cases. The fraud cases in our study came from 106 nations — with more than 40% of cases occurring in countries outside the United States — providing a truly global view into the plague of occupational fraud. In our 2010 Report, we have, for the first time ever, widened our study to include cases from countries outside the United States. This expansion allows us to more fully explore the truly global nature of occupational fraud and provides an enhanced view into the severity and impact of these crimes. Additionally, we are able to compare the anti-fraud measures taken by organizations worldwide in order to give fraud fighters everywhere the most applicable and useful information to help them in their fraud prevention and detection efforts." Details: Austin, TX: ACFE, 2011. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 121325 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCorruptionFraud and Abuse |
Author: Keil, Maria Clara Mauricio Pereira Title: An Investigation into the Success Factors Amongst Small Businesses in Gauteng Summary: Gauteng, the smallest of the nine South African provinces, but the largest in terms of its contribution to national GDP (33.9%), generates 10% of Africa’s GDP (Gauteng Enterprise Propeller Overview, 2007) and is therefore a very important geo-economical zone. As South Africa latest unemployment rate is 25.5% (StatsSA, 2006), Government is geared towards promoting small businesses in an effort to grow the economy and reduce unemployment. It is therefore very important to the economy that small businesses succeed, grow and provide employment. Due to the fact that at present, very little research into the success factors amongst small businesses in South Africa has been conducted in South Africa, it seems appropriate at this time to investigate the success factors of small businesses in Gauteng. The problem statement in this research is that there is insufficient knowledge relating to the factors contributing to the failure or success of small businesses in South Africa, Gauteng. To conduct this research, a qualitative and exploratory approach was decided upon. A literature survey on the subject was conducted in order to ground the current research in existing theory and research. A questionnaire was sent out by e-mail to 3776 businesses in Gauteng, to which the response rate was 3.15% (119 questionnaires were returned). The questionnaire was divided into sections and covered the definition of success, entrepreneurial personality characteristics of owner/manager, use of management tools, resource availability and the classification of respondents and their businesses. Due to the small size of the sample this research is not able to conclusively achieve the primary research objective of identifying the success factors of small businesses in Gauteng, but it has nevertheless contributed to the body of research on the matter, since it established that there is a correlation between: • Entrepreneurial personality and the success of small businesses • The use of management tools and the success of small businesses • The availability of resources and the success of small businesses. In addition the following can be reported: • The owner/managers surveyed attributed their success to: - persistence and determination - experience - entrepreneurial personality - business knowledge - a great team - education • The existence and or use of the business plan and its relationship to success remains inconclusive • Financial resources do not feature prominently as a success factor, but business skills do seem to correlate with success. Further research is necessary to pinpoint conclusively which traits and behaviours are conducive to success, by comparing successful and unsuccessful business owners. Other recommendations that arose from this research were: • Research should be conducted into the assumption that economic growth is driven by the proliferation of small businesses • Research into the weight of internal factors ((personality, experience, attitude, knowledge) versus that of external factors (start-up capital, business plans, skill availability, economic and legal conditions) would contribute to the body of knowledge and could trigger a shift in approach. The issue of the relationship between crime and the high unemployment rates in Gauteng are addressed in chapter 3. Details: Johannesburg, S. Africa: University of Johannesburg, Faculty of Management, 2009. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 27, 2011 at: http://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/10210/2342/1/Keil.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South Africa URL: http://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/10210/2342/1/Keil.pdf Shelf Number: 121408 Keywords: Bank RobberiesCommercial CrimesCrimes Against BusinessUnemployment and crime (South Africa) |
Author: Prenzler, Tim Title: Welfare Fraud in Australia: Dimensions and Issues Summary: This paper examines anti-fraud measures currently operating in Australia’s welfare system, administered by the government agency, Centrelink. Using official data, an examination is made of the operations and rationales of different strategies and their impacts, including estimated savings. The paper covers nine strategies, including data-matching, public tip-offs, media campaigns, stepped-up investigations and recovery action. The findings indicate that Centrelink has adopted international best practice measures to combat fraud and appears to be particularly successful at detecting and stopping fraud. At the same time, the main challenge appears to lie in the area of finding and demonstrating more effective primary prevention measures. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 421: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 122021 Keywords: Commercial CrimesFraudWelfare Fraud (Australia) |
Author: Thornton, Alex Title: Commercial Victimisation Survey 2012: Feasibility Report Summary: The 2012 Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) is the first of a new series of surveys run by the Home Office, designed to measure crime against businesses in England and Wales. This new series, currently scheduled to run in 2012, 2013 and 2014, builds on the two previous Home Office CVS surveys carried out in 1994 and 2002. Both previous surveys were limited to small and medium sized businesses in the retail and manufacturing sectors with interviews carried out by telephone. The two surveys are regarded as among the most comprehensive studies of crime against business in England and Wales measuring crime at premises rather than enterprise level1. The 2002 CVS also included a smaller postal survey of head offices (primarily to collect information about the financial impacts of crime) although, due to a very low response rate, data from this was not included in the 2002 report. In 2012 it was agreed that the CVS would focus on data at the premises level, collecting information on experience and costs of crime, responses to victimisation, insurance and crime prevention measures, local policing and business characteristics. Compared with previous CVS surveys, the 2012 survey was widened to cover four business areas; retail, manufacturing, the service sector and transport and distribution. The 2012 survey would again be conducted through telephone interviews. This report provides a summary of various stages of feasibility work carried out by TNS BMRB between April and July 2012. Work was carried out to develop the survey methodology and questionnaire for the 2012 CVS and consisted of three main stages: 1) A comprehensive review of the CVS sample design. This included making a recommendation of the survey population, obtaining the most accurate business population counts, and developing a process for looking up telephone numbers for sampled premises 2) Cognitive interviews with respondents at a range of individual business premises to fully test the draft questionnaire 3) A robust dress rehearsal of 100 interviews designed to test comprehensively all aspects of the survey processes. This provided an opportunity to test the questionnaire produced from the feasibility study and amend it prior to the main stage survey. The report is divided into the three sections outlined above. In addition to these three stages, a stakeholder workshop was carried out on 19th June with members of the CVS Steering Group and Virtual Reference Group. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss emerging findings from the early stages of the feasibility work with key stakeholders from outside the Home Office research team. Details: London: Home Office, 2012. 191p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 23, 2013 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/cvs-feasibility-report-2012?view=Binary Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/cvs-feasibility-report-2012?view=Binary Shelf Number: 127359 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCrime Against BusinessesRetail CrimeVictimization Surveys (U.K.) |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Crime Against businesses: Headline Findings from the 2012 Commercial Victimisation Survey Summary: The 2012 Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) is the first of a new series of Home Office surveys covering crime against businesses, with plans to repeat the survey in 2013 and 2014. The CVS was a recommendation from the National Statistician’s review of crime statistics to address the significant gap in crime statistics that existed for crimes against businesses. These are not covered by either of the two main sources of data on crime: the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and crimes recorded by the police, both of which are published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). While police recorded crime does include crimes against businesses, it does not separate these out from other crimes (other than for offences such as shoplifting which, by its nature, is against businesses) and also only includes those crimes that are reported to, and recorded by, the police. The CSEW is a survey of crime against households and individuals living in those households and so does not cover crime against businesses at all. Details: London: Home Office, 2013. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 29, 2013 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/crime-business-prem-2012/crime-business-prem-2012-pdf?view=Binary Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/crime-business-prem-2012/crime-business-prem-2012-pdf?view=Binary Shelf Number: 127413 Keywords: Commercial CrimesCrime StatisticsCrimes Against BusinessesVictimization Survey (U.K.) |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The Shadow Economy Summary: Summary: • Measurement of the shadow economy is notoriously difficult as it requires estimation of economic activity that is deliberately hidden from official transactions. Surveys typically understate the size of the shadow economy but econometric techniques can now be used to obtain a much better understanding of its size. • The shadow economy constitutes approximately 10 per cent of GDP in the UK; about 14 per cent in Nordic countries and about 20–30 per cent in many southern European countries. • The main drivers of the shadow economy are (in order): tax and social security burdens, tax morale, the quality of state institutions and labour market regulation. A reduction in the tax burden is therefore likely to lead to a reduction in the size of the shadow economy. Indeed, a virtuous circle can be created of lower tax rates, less shadow work, higher tax morale, a higher tax take and the opportunity for lower rates. Of course, a vicious circle in the other direction can also be created. • Given this relationship, the high level of non-wage costs (averaging 39 per cent of total labour costs) and the penalty on individuals who move from earning one third to two thirds of the median wage (averaging 58 per cent of the increase in earnings for a one-earner couple) in the European Union should be a matter of real concern. The latter figure is 79 per cent in the UK and thus low-paid UK workers have a huge incentive to supplement their incomes in the shadow economy. • The number of participants in the shadow economy is very large. Although up-to-date figures are not available, at the end of the twentieth century up to 30 million people performed shadow work in the EU and up to 48 million in the OECD. Reliable detailed studies are not available for many countries. In Denmark, however, the latest studies suggest that about half the population purchases shadow work. In some sectors – such as construction – about half the workforce is working in the shadow economy, often in addition to formal employment. Only a very small proportion of shadow economy workers can be accounted for by illegal immigrants in most countries. • In western Europe, shadow work is relatively prevalent among the unemployed and the formally employed. Other non-employed (for example, the retired, homemakers and students) do relatively less shadow work. This has implications for policy in terms of the importance of social security systems that reduce the opportunities for shadow work among the unemployed and the importance of tax systems that do not discourage the declaring of extra income. • Policies focused on deterrence are not likely to be especially successful when tackling the shadow economy. The shadow economy is pervasive and made up of a huge number of small and highly dispersed transactions. We should also be wary about trying to stamp out the shadow economy as we may stamp out the entrepreneurship and business formation that goes with it. • There are, however, huge potential benefits from allowing the self-employed and small businesses to formalise their arrangements. Businesses cannot flourish if they remain in the shadow economy. They might be reluctant to formalise, however, if it involves admitting to past indiscretions. Worthwhile policies include: reducing business compliance regulation; amnesties; providing limited tax shelters for small-scale informal activity such as the provision of interest-bearing loans to relatives and friends; and allowing businesses to formalise using simple ‘off the shelf’ models. Such policies have been successful in other countries – and to a limited extent in the UK – with high benefit-to-cost ratios. • Given that the shadow economy constitutes a high proportion of national income, and varies between less than 8 per cent of national income and over 30 per cent of national income in OECD countries, official national income statistics can often be misleading. Comparisons are made even more difficult because some countries adjust figures for the shadow economy (for example, Italy) and others do not. • In less developed countries, the informal sector constitutes typically between 25 and 40 per cent of national income and represents up to 70 per cent of non-agricultural employment. In such countries, informal activity often arises because of the inadequacies of legal systems when it comes to formalising business registration. Details: London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Shelf Number: 128963 Keywords: Commercial CrimesEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimeShadow Economy (U.K.)Tax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Snowdon, Christopher Title: Drinking in the Shadow Economy Summary: Executive summary: • One in ten bottles or cans of beer sold in the UK have not had duty paid on them and there are growing reports of counterfeit spirits being sold by licit and illicit retailers. HMRC seized almost ten million litres of non-duty paid alcohol in 2010/11, a rise of 30 per cent in two years. The UK loses more revenue from the cross-border movement of alcohol than any other EU state. The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that encourage the production, distribution and purchasing of alcohol in the shadow economy. • Unrecorded alcohol encompasses smuggled alcohol, commercially manufactured counterfeit alcohol, domestic brewing and distilling, surrogate alcohol, alcohol fraud and cross-border shopping. Failing to deal with alcohol’s shadow economy threatens not only the public finances, but also public health and public order. Counterfeit spirits and surrogate alcohol frequently contain dangerous levels of methanol, isopropanol and other chemicals which cause toxic hepatitis, blindness and death. Alcohol smuggling and counterfeiting is linked to other illegal activities, including drug smuggling, prostitution, violence, money-laundering and terrorism. • Factors which lead to shadow economic activity include high taxes and social security payments, low tax morale, complex tax systems, low Gross Domestic Product, weak institutions and corruption. Evidence shows that the illicit alcohol market is also closely associated with high taxes, corruption and poverty. The affordability of alcohol appears to be the key determinant behind the supply and demand for smuggled and counterfeit alcohol. Affordability is low in some countries due to low incomes (e.g. Eastern Europe) and in others because of high alcohol duty (e.g. Scandinavia). The price of alcohol in neighbouring markets also influences rates of unofficial consumption. • Demand for alcohol is relatively inelastic and drinkers have a series of options available to them when real prices increase. They can do as the government hopes and drink less, but they can also do any of the following: (1) make savings elsewhere in the household budget, (2) switch from the on-trade to the off-trade, (3) downshift to cheaper drinks, (4) shop abroad, (5) brew or distil their own alcohol, (6) buy counterfeit or smuggled alcohol, and finally (7) buy surrogate alcohol (e.g. methanol, antifreeze, aftershave). The extent to which consumption patterns change depends on personal income and the affordability of alcohol. • Our analysis indicates that the affordability of alcohol does not have a strong effect on how much alcohol is consumed. Once unrecorded alcohol is included in the estimates, it can be seen that countries with the least affordable alcohol have the same per capita alcohol consumption rates as those with the most affordable alcohol. • Alcohol duty provides significant income to European governments, but maximising these revenues carries significant risks in terms of health, crime and secondary poverty. Lessons can be learnt from countries which have low rates of unrecorded alcohol. We conclude that economic prosperity, moderate taxation and minimal corruption are essential for a country to minimise the size the alcohol black market. Without these preconditions, efforts to tackle the illicit alcohol supply through education, deterrence and enforcement are unlikely to succeed. Details: London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: IEA Discussion paper no. 43: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/drinking-in-the-shadow-economy Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/drinking-in-the-shadow-economy Shelf Number: 128964 Keywords: Alcohol IndustryBusiness CrimesCommercial CrimesFraudIllegal Alcohol SalesShadow EconomyTax Evasion |
Author: Oxford Economics Title: Cyber-attacks: Effects on UK Companies Summary: Gary Becker's seminal 1968 paper on the economics of crime shaped the way economists think about crime policy and is still applied in many contexts today. Becker explored the decision making function of rational criminal actors, suggesting that criminals choose to engage in illicit activity based on their own assessment of the costs and benefits. Rational criminal actors weigh up the potential yield from a criminal act, the risk of being caught and the severity of the punishment. The decision making process of state-sponsored cyber-attacks differs from that of ordinary criminals in important ways, which may potentially limit the direct applicability of the traditional economic models of crime such as Becker's. State-sponsored attackers are characterised by the very fact that a "non-profit" state entity is involved (as opposed to Becker's individual "for profit" criminals), potential information asymmetry, a perception of immunity from prosecution and the intangible value attributed to acts of patriotism (which does not figure in traditional economic approaches to crime, such as Becker's). At the same time, there is value in understanding the economic theory of crime, as advanced by Becker. States are unlikely to change their activities in the short term, particularly because of non-pecuniary/distorted concepts of returns. However they may do so in the long term, especially if deterred by adequate security measures and changes in operational procedures, (i.e. if the costs of cyber-attacks rise) and as they realise that the returns to cyber-attacks may be mixed at best . This again points to a need for firms to understand the nature of - and threat posed by - current attacks, so as to raise the costs of cyber-attacks for nation-state perpetrators in order to help deter future attacks. Apart from the implications for individual firms, cyber-attacks impact on the UK economy as a whole in two major ways: - Increasing the cost of doing business - Distorting the pattern of long run investment ("dynamic effects") Survey work on the nature of cyber-attacks in the UK undertaken by Oxford Economics and the Ponemon Institute found the following: - Cyber-attacks are a common problem. 60% of respondents had experienced a cyber-attack within the last 12 months. - Loss estimates were highest for damage to reputation/branding. All other costs were reported with raw averages around the $2 million mark, with adjusted means slightly under half that and medians of $175,000. However, the raw average reputation/branding loss estimate was $2.9 million. - Intellectual property and commercially sensitive data is stolen in all sectors, but by no means happens to everyone. With this in mind it is interesting to note that 80% of respondents reported that they had not experienced any IP or commercially sensitive information loss in the last 24 months. - The majority of firms who did suffer a loss of IP or commercially sensitive information felt they were damaged by it. 61% said that they had experienced a loss of competitive advantage due to the loss of IP. 59% said that they had experienced a loss of competitive advantage due to the loss of commercially sensitive information. - The most common loss of competitive advantage came in the shape of "compromised negotiations or business ventures" (31%), followed by the "appearance of copied products or practise" (20%) and the "emergence of new competition" (19%). - While only a minority of companies suffer IP/commercially sensitive information losses, the cost of such losses is considerably higher than is the case for "day to day" losses. The adjusted mean loss of IP was valued at $13.2 million and the adjusted mean loss of commercially sensitive business information was valued at $12.8 million. In addition to the survey of UK firms, which identifies the direct costs incurred as a result of cyber-attacks, Oxford Economics has undertaken an event study to analyse the potential reputational loss firms may suffer. As a proxy for reputational damage we use negative stock market returns that may be experienced immediately around the public disclosure of a cyber-attack. Although further confirmatory analysis would be useful, our results suggest that publicised cyber-attacks do generally have impacts on stock market valuations and, by extension, upon corporate reputations. If this is the case, it means that the investment companies make in IT security to prevent these attacks may maintain shareholder value for these companies. Details: Oxford, UK: Oxford Economics, 2014. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2014/oxford-economics-cyber-effects-uk-companies.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2014/oxford-economics-cyber-effects-uk-companies.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb Shelf Number: 133418 Keywords: Commercial CrimesComputer CrimesCosts of CrimeCrimes Against BusinessesCyber SecurityCybercrime (U.K.)Economic AnalysisEconomic Crimes |